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After convicting a defendant of a capital crime, a jury in South Carolina
must sentence the defendant either to death or to life imprisonment.' Two
current statutes, enacted as part of The Omnibus Criminal Justice Improve-
ments Act of 1986,2 dictate the minimum time a capital defendant must
serve before becoming eligible for parole. South Carolina Code section 16-
3-20(A) provides that capital defendants sentenced to life imprisonment are
not eligible for parole until they serve at least twenty years.3 If the jury
finds an aggravating circumstance, the defendant must serve at least thirty
years of a life sentence before becoming eligible for parole.' Under section
24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code, a defendant serving a sentence for
a previous violent crime conviction is wholly ineligible for parole from a
subsequently imposed life sentence.'
However, evidence indicates that almost half of the citizens in South
Carolina who are eligible to serve on capital juries believe that a convicted
murderer sentenced to life imprisonment would probably spend less than
twenty years in prison.6 An overwhelming majority of potential jurors sur-
* B.A., University of Minnesota; M.A., Ph.D., University of Illinois at Chicago
Circle; J.D., University of South Carolina. Thanks to Daniel T. Stacey and Professor
William S. McAninch for comments on earlier versions of this Note.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
2. No. 462, 1986 S.C. Acts 2955 (codified as amended in scattered sections of S.C.
CODE ANN.).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A). Between 1977 and 1986, any capital defendant
sentenced to life imprisonment was ineligible for parole before serving at least 20 years.
See Act of June 8, 1977, No. 177, § 1, 1977 S.C. Acts 407, 407, amended by The
Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, § 27, 1986 S.C. Acts at 2983
(codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A)). Between 1948 and 1977, a
defendant serving a life sentence for a capital crime was eligible for parole after serving
only ten years. See Act of May 26, 1949, No. 199, § 2, 1949 S.C. Acts 311, 311,
amended by Act of June 8, 1977, § 1, 1977 S.C. Acts at 407.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
6. Affidavit of Dr. Robert W. Oldendick, Record at 2327, State v. Simmons, 427
1
Hughes: Informing South Carolina Capital Juries About Parole
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
veyed believes that a capital defendant would not have to serve a life
sentence to completion.7 Finally, more than three out of four of the
potential jurors surveyed stated that information about the length of time a
convicted murderer would serve if sentenced to life imprisonment would
figure importantly in their capital sentencing decision.' These results are
consistent with the findings of similar studies in Georgia and Virginia.9
The implications of the discrepancy between statutory reality and juror
misconception concerning parole eligibility are obvious. If a jury mistakenly
believes that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment will actually spend
less time in prison than the jury thinks he or she deserves, the jury will be
inclined to render a death sentence. '0
Despite potential jurors' misinformation about the parole possibilities
of capital defendants, the South Carolina Supreme Court recently overruled
State v. Atkins" and reinstituted the ban on providing capital sentencing
juries with information about parole.' 2 The purpose of this Note is to
examine critically the supreme court's reasoning in State v. Torrence13 and
to trace the evolution of the supreme court's position on informing capital
S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1993). Dr. Oldendick, Director of the Survey Research Laboratory of
the University of South Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs, conducted this random
telephone survey between June 17 and June 22, 1991. The potential sampling error is
± 4.4%. "Tables 1-3 present the data for those people whose opinion concerning the
death penalty depended upon the circumstances of the case; that is, they neither favored
nor opposed the death penalty in all cases in which a person is convicted of murder." Id.
at 2325. Tables 1-3 are reproduced in the Appendix to this Note.
7. See Appendix, Table 1.
8. See Appendix, Table 3.
9. The evidence from similar studies in Georgia and Virginia shows that a majority
of potential jurors who favor the death penalty believes: (1) that a defendant sentenced
to life imprisonment would spend between seven and ten years in prison; and (2) that
actual time to be served is important to the penalty determination. See Anthony Paduano
& Clive A.S. Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the
Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 221-25 &
nn.30-35 (1987) (providing statistics from Georgia study); William W. Hood, III, Note,
The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital
Sentencing, 75 VA. L. Rav. 1605, 1620-25 & nn.98-105 (1989) (providing statistics from
Virginia study). Moreover, the Virginia study revealed that a majority of the potential
jurors surveyed would disregard a judge's instructions not to consider parole. Id. at 1624
& n.103.
10. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 210 S.C. 480, 486-88, 43 S.E.2d 360, 362-63 (1947)
(remanding a capital case for a new trial after the solicitor told the jury that a sentence
of life imprisonment "does not mean that [the defendant] will serve for life").
11. 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), overruled by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C.
45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
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sentencing juries about parole. The author argues that the Torrence court
overlooked the original rationale behind prohibiting parole information in
capital cases, and that the original rationale actually provides good reasons
for lifting the ban on informing capital juries about parole.
Part II of this Note summarizes the Torrence concurring opinion14 that
overruled Atkins and introduces some of the important issues. Part III is a
detailed analysis of the evolution of the South Carolina Supreme Court's
position on informing capital juries about parole possibilities. This analysis
supports the view that the original reason for the proscription on providing
capital juries with information about parole was to shield defendants from
prejudice that could unnecessarily cost them their lives. The author's main
argument is that the court formalized its original concern in a "legislative
intent" rationale, but eventually lost sight of the underlying purpose of
protecting capital defendants from inappropriate death sentences. By losing
sight of the original justification for the rule, the court has turned the
legislative intent rationale on its head.
Part IV addresses some of the constitutional issues raised by the
exclusion of parole information from jury consideration. Although the
United States Supreme Court has recognized the states' rights to prevent
informing juries about parole, this right does not support the South Carolina
Supreme Court's view on this issue. Finally, in Part V, the author proposes
a model jury instruction that provides an equitable solution.
II. THE TORRENCE DECISION
A jury convicted Michael R. Torrence of armed robbery, burglary, and
two murders. At the time of the trial, Torrence was already serving a life
sentence for a previous unrelated murder conviction. Before closing
arguments in the penalty phase, defense counsel requested a charge that,
under section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code, imposition of a life
sentence would require imprisonment without the possibility of parole.' 5
The trial court refused to give the charge, but stated that it would, upon
request, give an Atkins charge on parole eligibility. 6
State v. Atkins 7 authorized a trial court, upon a capital defendant's
14. Id. at 55-60, 406 S.E.2d at 321-23 (Chandler, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 52-53, 406 S.E.2d at 319-20. The pertinent part of § 24-21-640 provides:
"The [B]oard [of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services] must not grant parole nor is
parole authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent
conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for violent crimes as
defined in Section 16-1-60." S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
Under the statutory definition, murder is a violent crime. Id. § 16-1-60.
16. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 53, 406 S.E.2d at 320.
17. 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), overruled by Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406
1993]
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request, to give one of two charges regarding possible sentences and parole
eligibility. First, the court could charge the sentencing jury that "the term
'life imprisonment' is to be understood in its ordinary and plain mean-
ing."18 Second, instead of the "ordinary and plain meaning" charge, the
defendant could request a charge that imposition of a life sentence would
require service of at least twenty or thirty years without the possibility of
parole, depending on the absence or presence of aggravating circumstanc-
es. 9 Torrence's defense counsel requested the latter charge, which the
court gaveY2 The jury sentenced Torrence to life imprisonment for one
murder and to death for the other.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the trial court
committed prejudicial error by refusing to charge the jury that if Torrence
was sentenced to life imprisonment, he would be ineligible for parole.
Writing the main opinion, Justice Finney concluded that denying the charge
request was prejudicial error in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article V, section 21 of
the South Carolina Constitution.2" Justice Finney stated that Torrence
"sought only to have the court declare correct and current law relevant to
his case,"2 and that, "as applied to facts of the present case, the Atkins
charge was an incorrect statement of appellant's parole eligibility had
another life sentence been imposed."' Finally, Justice Finney observed
that "[t]he requested charge was a correct statement of law which would
have provided the jury with accurate information regarding appellant's
parole eligibility. "24
However, in Justice Chandler's concurrence, the remainder of the court
effectively overruled Atkins, "reinstat[ing] earlier precedent prohibiting
capital sentencing juries from being informed about parole."' The
S.E.2d 315.
18. Id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305.
19. Id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305-06. Section 16-3-20(A) of the South Carolina Code
dictates the parole possibilities for defendants convicted of murder. S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
20. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 53, 406 S.E.2d at 320.




25. Id. at 55, 406 S.E.2d at 321 (Chandler, J., concurring). The Torrence decision
contains four separate opinions. As previously discussed, the main opinion, written by
Justice Finney, concluded that the denial of Torrence's request to inform the jury about
his parole ineligibility was unconstitutional. Id. at 54, 406 S.E.2d at 320 (Finney, J.).
In addition, Justice Finney's opinion stated that, although a defendant may present
witnesses who know and care for him to ask for mercy on his behalf, a defendant may
[Vol. 44:383
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concurrence characterized Atkins as an ill-conceived aberration from a long
line of cases that disapprove of providing capital juries with parole
information. Justice Chandler stated that the Atkins instructions were
"incompatible not only with the rationale of the substantial body of law
preceding Atkins, but also with that of our decisions which followed."26
An analysis of the evolution of the court's view shows Atkins to be an
attempt to apply precedential rationale in an equitable and reasonable
manner and Torrence as a reversion to the letter of the law at the expense
of its spirit. The initial prohibition against informing capital juries about
defendants' parole possibilities was rooted in an admirable and rational
concern for preventing the most egregious possible prejudice to a defendant:
an unnecessary death sentence. Unfortunately, in light of recent statutory
changes, the proscription reinstated by Torrence actually prejudices the
defendant in many cases.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE COURT'S VIEW
The South Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
informing capital juries about parole in State v. Hinton.27 The solicitor in
Hinton told the jury: "'If you recommend mercy the sentence would be life
imprisonment, but even that does not necessarily mean that he will serve for
life there.'"' Defense counsel objected, and the solicitor remarked to the
not present witnesses merely to testify about their religious or philosophical attitudes
about the death penalty, nor may the defendant present witnesses to give an opinion about
what verdict the jury "ought" to reach. Id. at 50-51, 406 S.E.2d at 318-19 (citing Childs
v. State, 357 S.E.2d 48, 60 (Ga.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970 (1987)). In Part II of the
opinion the court held that when a capital defendant's disputed statement is introduced
during the penalty phase of a trial, the jury should be instructed to determine the
voluntariness of the disputed statement if the jury has not previously made that
determination. Id. at 51-52, 406 S.E.2d at 319.
Justice Chandler, joined by Chief Justice Gregory and Justices Harwell and Toal,
concurred in the result, but called for reinstating the ban on informing capital sentencing
juries about parole. Id. at 55, 406 S.E.2d at 321 (Chandler, J., concurring).
Justice Toal, joined by Chief Justice Gregory and Justices Harwell and Chandler,
filed an opinion concurring in the result and abolishing the doctrine of infavorem vitae,
which required the supreme court to review the entire record of a capital trial and to
consider unpreserved errors. Id. at 60-61, 406 S.E.2d at 323-24 (Toal, J., concurring).
Justice Finney filed a separate opinion dissenting with the majority's concurring decision
to abolish infavorem vitae. Id. at 72, 406 S.E.2d at 330 (Finney, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the Torrence court's treatment of infavorem vitae, see James M. Hughes,
Survey, Criminal Law-State v. Torrence, 44 S.C. L. REV. 55, 56-58 (1992).
26. Id. at 58, 406 S.E.2d at 323 (Chandler, J., concurring).
27. 210 S.C. 480, 43 S.E.2d 360 (1947).
28. Id. at 486, 43 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting solicitor's closing argument).
1993]
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court: "'That is the law, as they are eligible for parole after five to ten
years.'"29 Ruling that the statements were unjustified and possibly prejudi-
cial, the court observed that "the only logical inference" a jury could draw
from the statements was that "a verdict of murder should be rendered
because some other department of the state government might shorten or
commute a life sentence. "30 Clearly, the reasoning of the court was that the
solicitor's remarks concerning parole were prejudicial because they may
have improperly induced the jury to render a death sentence.
In State v. Morris3' the court reiterated its concern about the prejudi-
cial effect of comments about parole. The Morris jury asked the trial judge
a question concerning parole and possible verdicts. Although exactly what
the jury had asked was unclear, the supreme court approved the trial judge's
limited response. The supreme court stated that had the trial court given the
jury information about the possibility of parole, "it could well be argued that
the court erred in doing so to the prejudice of [the defendant]."32 Again,
preventing prejudice to the defendant was the court's justification for the
prohibition on informing the jury about parole.
Both Hinton and Morris stand for the proposition that remarks to a
capital jury about a defendant's parole possibilities may prejudice the
defendant. However, one may extract a narrower rule from these two cases:
neither the solicitor nor the trial court should inform a capital jury about the
defendant's chances for parole. Although most defendants likely would not
request a jury charge that they would be eligible for parole in ten years if
sentenced to life imprisonment, the situation is dramatically different when
the defendant is completely ineligible for parole.
Almost twenty years later, in State v. Atkinson,33 the supreme court
delivered one of its most important opinions about providing capital juries
with parole information. Atkinson is pivotal because the supreme court
articulated a "legislative intent" rationale for its rule that capital juries
should not be informed about a defendant's parole possibilities.34 More
29. Id. (quoting solicitor).
30. Id. at 488, 43 S.E.2d at 363. The jury in Hinton could have convicted the
defendants of the following charges: murder, which carried a sentence of death; murder
with a recommendation of mercy, which carried a sentence of life imprisonment; or
manslaughter. See id. at 488-89, 43 S.E.2d at 363.
31. 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E.2d 744 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1001 (1964), and
overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
32. Id. at 232, 133 S.E.2d at 747.
33. 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 936 (1972),
and overruled on other grounds by Torrence, 305 S.C. 43, 406 S.E.2d 315.
34. See id. at 534-35, 172 S.E.2d at 112. The Torrence decision, which reinstates
the ban on parole information, relied heavily on Atkinson: "The holding in Atkinson
served as a basis for numerous decisions concerning the introduction of parole into the
Vol. 44:383
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importantly, however, all of the sources upon which Atkinson relies specify
that preventing prejudice to the defendant is the underlying justification for
the prohibition on informing capital juries about a defendant's parole
eligibility."
In Atkinson the jury interrupted its deliberations to ask the court
whether the defendant would become eligible for parole or pardon if the jury
rendered a verdict carrying a life sentence.36 The trial court told the jury
members that the issue of parole was no concern of theirs and that the
parole board decides whether to release eligible prisoners." Shortly
thereafter, the jury returned a verdict of guilty without recommendation of
mercy, which carried a sentence of death by electrocution. The defendant
complained that the trial court gravely prejudiced him by commenting, even
briefly, about the parole system.3"
The supreme court affirmed, ruling that a sentencing jury should not be
invited to speculate on the possible effect of parole. The court concluded
that the trial court's instructions were consistent with this rule.3 9 The
Atkinson court relied upon several sources for its decision4° and stated that
"[t]he rationale of this view was well exprseed [sic]" in the New Jersey case
of State v. White:4
"The Legislature committed to the jury the responsibility to
determine in the first instance whether punishment should be life or
death. It charged another agency with the responsibility of deciding how
a life sentence shall be executed. The jurors perform their task
completely when they decide the matter assigned to them upon the
evidence before them. What happens thereafter is no concern of theirs.
It is no more proper for a jury to conclude that death be the penalty
sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial provided under our present death penalty law."
Torrence, 305 S.C. at 56, 406 S.E.2d at 321 (Chandler, J., concurring).
35. See infra note 40 (listing the sources upon which Atkinson relies to support the
"legislative intent" rationale).
36. Atkinson, 253 S.C. at 534, 172 S.E.2d at 112.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 535, 172 S.E.2d 112-13.
40. The Atkinson court cited, in order, W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Procedure to be
Followed Where Jury Requests Information as to Possibility of Pardon or Parole from
Sentence Imposed, 35 A.L.R.2D 769 (1954) [hereinafter Shipley, Procedure to be
Followed]; W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Statement or Instruction of
Court as to Possibility of Parole or Pardon, 12 A.L.R.3D 832 (1967) [hereinafter
Shipley, Prejudicial Effect]; People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1964) (en bane);
and State v. White, 142 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958). Atkinson, 253 S.C. at 534-35, 172 S.E.2d
at 112.
41. 142 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958).
1993]
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because a life sentence may be commuted or the defendant paroled, then
(sic) it would be for a trial judge in other criminal causes deliberately
to impose an excessive sentence to frustrate the statutory scheme
committing parole to another agency. " 42
The Torrence concurrence was also impressed with some of the
reasoning in White, but quoted only the first half of this passage, up to the
phrase "no concern of theirs."' Thus, Torrence misleadingly implies that
the Atkinson court's sole rationale for prohibiting juries from hearing parole
information was that the legislature intended the duties of the jury and the
parole board to be distinct, without regard to possible prejudice to the
defendant.
Although quoted by neither the Atkinson nor the Torrence court, the
next three sentences of the White opinion illustrate the concerns underlying
the original "legislative intent" view:
That death should be inflicted when a life sentence is appropriate is an
abhorrent thought. We should not attribute that purpose to the Legisla-
ture. The Legislature could not have intended that juries shall weigh the
death penalty against something less than a life sentence and by that
process arrive at a punishment which does not fit the facts. 44
Furthermore, other sources relied upon by Atkinson support the
conclusion that preventing prejudice to the defendant was the underlying
motive for invoking the legislative intent rationale.45 In discussing cases
which hold that informing capital juries about parole ordinarily results in
prejudicial error, an annotation cited by Atkinson provides the following
explanation:
The theory underlying this proposition is that the guilt and punishment
of a defendant in a criminal case should be determined at the time of the
trial, and the essential and relevant factors be considered and incorporat-
ed into a decision settling all the issues to which the judicial process is
applicable, and that because questions of parole, probation, and pardon
rest largely upon future conditions and considerations determinable by
42. Atkinson, 253 S.C. at 535, 172 S.E.2d at 112 (alteration in original) (quoting
White, 142 A.2d at 76).
43. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 56, 406 S.E.2d 315, 321 (1991) (Chandler, J.,
concurring).
44. White, 142 A.2d at 76 (emphasis added). The Atkinson court may have refrained
from including this passage because it would have undermined the court's affirmation of
Atkinson's death sentence.
45. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:383
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other than judicial officials, anticipation of or reliance upon the attitudes
and actions of those officials, in making the judicial decision, to the
likely detriment of the defendant, is prejudicial and therefore reversible
error.
46
The Atkinson court also cited People v. Morse,47 a California decision
that is a leading case on the issue. Morse recognized that the original
purpose behind informing the jury about parole was "'to assist [the jury] in
assessing the significance of a life sentence.'"4 Even though such informa-
tion may be relevant, the Morse court observed that "the instruction, abetted
by the introduction of evidence as to the possibility of parole, has brought
about untoward consequences to defendants."" The California Supreme
Court eloquently expressed the reasons for invoking the legislative intent
rationale to prohibit courts from informing juries about parole:
The final and most dangerous error of permitting the jury to
consider the [parole board's] possible grant of parole is to induce it to
pass judgment upon the very issue foreclosed to it and to prevent the
proper body from deciding the issue at the proper time. The jury can
conclude that the [parole board] will improperly grant defendant parole
in the future; it may fear that the [parole board] will permit a "danger-
ous" defendant to walk the streets; it may then foreclose the [parole
board] from ever granting parole by imposing the death penalty. The
jury would thus improperly preempt the whole parole system and defeat
the legislative design. The jury would then utilize the death penalty for
fear that the [parole board] will not properly perform the function that
the Legislature has specifically delegated to it.
50
In cases following Atkinson the South Carolina Supreme Court has
increasingly relied on the legislative intent rationale to prohibit trial courts
from informing capital juries about parole. However, attention to the
underlying justification-preventing juries from rendering inappropriate
death sentences-has steadily diminished. Statutory changes increasing the
time that capital defendants must serve before becoming eligible for parole
46. Shipley, Prejudicial Effect, supra note 40, § 3, at 835 (emphasis added).
47. 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964) (en bane).
48. Id. at 36-37 (quoting People v. Purvis, 346 P.2d 22, 30 (Cal. 1959)).
49. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 41. In a footnote the Morse court continued, "As one writer put it, 'Tihe
fact that a person sentenced for life might be released before he may safely be returned
to society indicates a weakness in the parole system-not that he ought to have been
executed.'" Id. at 41 n.10 (alteration in original) (quoting RobertE. Knowlton, Problems
of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1099, 1119 (1953)).
19931
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or eliminating parole possibilities altogether have removed the justification
for the legislative intent rationale in many cases. In such cases, these
statutory changes have made reliance on the rationale inimical to its raison
d'etre. Accordingly, the Torrence court relied on a rationale that, at best,
often no longer has an underlying justification or, at worst, cuts against its
original logical underpinnings.
In State v. Brooks,"1 the first post-Atkinson case to address the issue
of informing jurors about parole, the trial judge made detailed references to
parole eligibility while charging the jury on murder and manslaughter. The
judge informed the jurors that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for
murder would be eligible for release or parole after serving ten years and
that a defendant convicted of manslaughter, which carried a maximum
sentence of thirty years, would be eligible for parole after serving one-third
of the maximum term, or ten years.52 Finally, the judge instructed the jury
that a defendant sentenced to twenty-five years would be eligible for parole
after serving approximately eight years and four months, which is "'a
difference of twenty months in a life sentence.'"53 The jury returned a
murder conviction.
The supreme court reversed Brooks's conviction and stated that the
"appellant was entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined without
regard to his eligibility for parole."" The court declared that the impres-
sion given to the jury-that there was no real distinction between the
penalties for murder and manslaughter-was "false and operated to
appellant's disadvantage when the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
murder."" By citing Atkinson, the court implicitly relied on the legislative
intent rationale; however, the Brooks court explicitly stated its concern about
the prejudicial effect of parole information given to the jury.
In State v. Goolsby5 6 the supreme court followed Atkinson and Brooks.
The trial judge in Goolsby charged the capital sentencing jury that a
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment would not be eligible for parole
until the service of at least twenty years, but later specifically instructed the
51. 271 S.C. 355, 247 S.E.2d 436 (1978).
52. Id. at 357-58, 247 S.E.2d at 437-38.
53. Id. at 358, 247 S.E.2d at 438 (quoting jury charge).
54. Id. at 359, 247 S.E.2d at 438 (emphasis added). The Brooks court stated: "A
jury should be neither invited nor permitted to speculate upon the possible effects of
parole upon a conviction." Id. (citing State v. Pulley, 216 S.C. 552, 59 S.E.2d 155
(1950); State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970), vacated in part, 408
U.S. 936 (1972), and overruled by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315
(1991); Shipley, Prejudicial Effect, supra note 40).
55. Id. at 360, 247 S.E.2d at 438-39 (emphasis added).
56. 275 S.C. 110,268 S.E.2d 31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980), and overruled
on other grounds by Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315.
[Vol. 44:383
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jurors not to consider parole in their deliberations.57 On appeal, the
supreme court stated that the charge referring to parole was erroneous, 5
but that the subsequent instruction cured the charge of "whatever minimal
prejudice" may have resulted. 9
State v. Butler" was the first indication of the supreme court's
willingness to eschew the original justification for the prohibition on
informing capital juries about parole and to rely solely on encapsulated
precedent. Butler's defense counsel requested a charge informing the jury
about parole ineligibility, but the trial judge denied the request. On appeal,
the court stated: "We have determined that a 'jury should be neither invited
nor permitted to speculate upon the possible effects of parole upon a convic-
tion.'" 61 The court noted that if the jury had inquired about parole, the
proper charge would have been the Atkinson charge that parole is "no
concern of yours.'62
Although the Butler court relied on Atkinson and Brooks for the rule
that capital sentencing juries should not be informed about parole, the court
abandoned the rule's underlying purpose of preventing prejudice to the
defendant. In Butler the defense counsel requested the charge. Unless
motivated by paternalism, the court's decision in Butler represents a triumph
of form over substance, marking the beginning of an unswerving adherence
to a rule whose justification is not always present.
In State v. Copeland63 one of the issues the court addressed was
whether the trial judge should have instructed the capital sentencing jury that
"life imprisonment means one will actually spend his life in prison."' On
appeal, Copeland asserted that "the jury will consider the possibility of
parole in its deliberations and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury
not to consider it injects an arbitrary factor into the trial."' The supreme
court disagreed.
While recognizing that jurors should not consider the possibility of
57. Id. at 124-25, 268 S.E.2d at 39.
58. See id. at 124-25, 268 S.E.2d at 39.
59. Id. at 125, 268 S.E.2d at 39.
60. 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Torrence,
305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315.
61. Id. at 547-48, 290 S.E.2d at 422 (quoting State v. Brooks, 271 S.C. 355, 359,
247 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1978)) (citing State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111
(1970) vacated in part, 408 U.S. 936 (1972), and overruled by Torrence, 305 S.C. 45,
406 S.E.2d 315).
62. Id. at 548, 290 S.E.2d at 422.
63. 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, and cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983).
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parole, the court stated that the trial judge's duty is not "to anticipate or
speculate that jurors might consider [parole] in their deliberations and
instruct them accordingly. "' The court opined that specifically instructing
a jury not to consider parole "may, in fact, inject consideration of parole
into their deliberations where it may not before have been."67
This reasoning, quoted in State v.Torrence,63 is questionable, but it
illustrates the dilemma that a trial court may have to confront. In many cases
the sentencing jury specifically requests information about the possibility of
parole. When the issue of parole
has come spontaneously to the jury's attention, it is perhaps not unduly
cynical to doubt the efficacy of any instruction to give it no weight or
consideration, and the alternatives would seem to be (1) to discharge the
jury forthwith, (2) to inform them of the law upon the subject, thus
insuring that if they do not heed the admonition to give the matter no
weight, they at least act upon correct information, a course which,
however, probably unavoidably encourages the consideration of such
matters, or (3) to refuse to answer, with admonition not to consider the
matter, and a reference to or repetition of the instructions upon the
assessment of punishment, a course which incurs the risk that the
admonition may be disregarded and the matter solved upon the basis of
the layman's information or misinformation upon the subject.69
Little justification exists for accepting the Copeland court's view that jurors
do not consider parole when deciding capital sentences,"0 even in the
absence of their request for such information.
In State v. Plath7' the supreme court forcefully reiterated the legisla-
tive intent rationale for disallowing information about parole, but the court
did not expressly mention the underlying justification for the prohibition. In
Plath defense counsel presented a witness who testified about the living
conditions of inmates serving life sentences. On cross-examination the
solicitor asked the witness if he had investigated the case of an inmate who
had escaped while serving a life sentence. The solicitor brought up the
subject again in subsequent jury argument.' Defense counsel objected that
the solicitor's question and comments introduced speculation about the
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 305 S.C. 45, 57, 406 S.E.2d 315, 322 (1991) (Chandler, J., concurring).
69. Shipley, Procedure to be Followed, supra note 40, at 770 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
70. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
71. 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984).
72. Id. at 12-14, 313 S.E.2d at 625-26.
[Vol. 44:383
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/5
INFORMING CAPITAL JURIES
defendant's possible escape or premature release. 3
The Plath court stated that the jury shall understand the term "life
imprisonment" in its ordinary and plain meaning.74 Arguably, this
admonition serves both as an implicit admission that juries probably do
consider parole in their deliberations and as an unrealistic attempt to prevent
that consideration.
Furthermore, without citing Atkinson, the Plath court declared:
In the sentencing phase of a capital case, the finction of the jury is
not to legislate a plan of punishment but to make the "either/or"
selection [of life imprisonment or death].... Such determinations
as ... the matter of parole are reserved by statute and our cases to
agencies other than the jury. As we have repeatedly stated, the sole
function of the jury in a capital sentencing trial is the individualized
selection of one or the other penalty .... 75
The Plath court's adamant reliance on legislative intent, without any
citations or underlying consideration, suggests that the court was merely
embracing a precedential shell.
The issue in State v. Norri$76 was similar to that presented in Atkin-
son. After deliberating for two hours, the jury in Norris asked whether the
defendant would be eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment. 7
Although the trial judge stated that the jury should not engage in such
speculation, he informed the jury that a defendant sentenced to life "'shall
not be eligible for parole until the service of twenty years.'"7 The jury
sentenced the defendant to death, but the supreme court reversed the
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.79
The Norris court based its holding on both legislative intent and
prevention of prejudice to the defendant. The court recognized that a
defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined without
regard to parole. 80 Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge's remark
that jurors should not speculate about parole did not cure the potential
73. Id. at 14, 313 S.E.2d at 626.
74. Id. at 14, 313 S.E.2d at 627.
75. Id. at 14-15, 313 S.E.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
76. 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
77. Id. at 94, 328 S.E.2d at 344.
78. Id. (quoting jury charge).
79. Id. at 96, 328 S.E.2d at 345.
80. Id. at 94-95, 328 S.E.2d at 344 (citing State v. Brooks, 271 S.C. 355, 359, 247
S.E.2d 436, 438 (1978)).
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prejudice to the defendant." Then, the court repeated the view that parole
eligibility is a matter of legislative determination.'2
The Norris court developed a two-part instruction that a trial court
should give to a jury inquiring about parole. First, in accord with Atkinson,
Brooks, and Butler, trial courts should instruct a jury "that it shall not
consider parole eligibility in reaching its decision."" Second, in accord
with Plath, the jury instruction should provide "that the terms 'life
imprisonment' and 'death sentence' should be understood in their ordinary
and plain meaning."I
In State v. Peterson' the court upheld the Norris instruction. During
sentencing phase deliberations, the jury in Peterson asked if one of its
choices was life imprisonment without parole. In violation of Norris, the
trial judge responded that the choices were death by electrocution or life
imprisonment, and that life without parole was not a choice.86 Again, the
jury returned a death sentence and the supreme court reversed.87
Peterson is more important for its implications concerning the popular
meaning of "life imprisonment" than for its express holding. Before the
jury's deliberations in the sentencing phase, the court charged the jury that
the possible sentences were life imprisonment or death. Nevertheless, the
jury returned and asked the court if one of the choices was life imprison-
ment without parole. 88 The obvious inference is that the jury did not
understand "life imprisonment" to mean that a defendant would spend the
rest of his life in jail without the possibility of parole.
Furthermore, the trial judge's response confirmed the jury's suspicions.
Instructing a jury that its sentencing choices are death or life imprisonment,
and that life imprisonment without parole is not a possible sentence, is
tantamount to telling the jury that "life imprisonment" does not mean life
imprisonment without parole. After receiving a Norris instruction, a jury's
speculation about possible parole is merely replaced by another form of
speculation: What is the ordinary and plain meaning of "life imprisonment"?
The Norris instruction is consistent with the legislative intent rationale
in that the instruction flatly tells jurors not to consider parole. However,
whether a Norris instruction actually prevents prejudice to the defendant
81. Id. at 95, 328 S.E.2d at 344.
82. Id. (citing State v. Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 14, 313 S.E.2d 619, 627 (1984)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Plath, 281 S.C. at 14, 313 S.E.2d at 627).
85. 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800 (1985) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
86. Id. at 248, 335 S.E.2d at 802.
87. Id. at 245, 335 S.E.2d at 801.
88. Id. at 248, 335 S.E.2d at 802.
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depends on the circumstances of the case and the amount of information or
misinformation the jury has about a particular defendant's parole possibili-
ties. By asking a question about parole during sentencing deliberations, a
capital jury indicates that it is aware that the possibility of parole often exists
for a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment. If the underlying goal of the
instruction is to prevent prejudice to the defendant by minimizing the
chances that a jury will render an unnecessary death sentence, the instruction
will have inconsistent results depending upon the particular circumstances
of the cases.
The Norris instruction would certainly prejudice a defendant who, if
sentenced to life imprisonment, would be wholly ineligible for parole
because he or she is serving a sentence for a prior violent crime convic-
tion. 9 Instead of preventing prejudice to the defendant or eliminating the
jury's speculation, the instruction implies that the defendant would be
eligible for parole. Under Norris, the jury is instructed not to consider
parole, paradoxically implying that the defendant will be eligible for parole.
Next, under the Norris instruction, the jury is told to understand "life
imprisonment" in its ordinary and plain meaning.' But, as the trial judge
in Peterson implied, most jurors believe the ordinary meaning of "life
imprisonment" is life with the possibility of parole.9 '
As part of The Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, 92
the South Carolina General Assembly enacted section 16-3-20(A) of the
South Carolina Code. 93 This section provides that defendants convicted of
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death must spend at
least twenty or thirty years in prison without the possibility of parole,
depending on the absence or presence of aggravating circumstances. 94 Also
enacted as part of the 1986 Act, 95 section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina
Code prohibits granting parole "to any prisoner serving a sentence for a
second or subsequent conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior
conviction, for violent crimes. "96
One year after the 1986 Act was passed, the South Carolina Supreme
Court issued a unanimous opinion in State v. Atkins.7' The defendant in
89. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), discussed supra
text accompanying note 5.
90. See supra text accompanying note 84.
91. See Peterson, 287 S.C. at 248, 335 S.E.2d at 802.
92. No. 462, 1986 S.C. Acts 2955 (codified as amended in scattered sections of S.C.
CODE ANN.).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
94. Id., discussed supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
95. The Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, § 30, 1986 S.C. Acts
at 2989-90.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
97. 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), overruled by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C.
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Atkins was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, defense
counsel claimed that "the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the
law governing parole consideration in capital sentencing." 98 The supreme
court, citing Norris and Butler, held that the trial judge properly refused to
give such instructions." Then, in a move that the Torrence concurrence
claimed was incompatible with earlier rationale," ° the Atkins court
announced the following rule:
In all death penalty cases which proceed to trial after this opinion is
published, if requested by the defendant, the trial judge shall charge the
jury that the term "life imprisonment" is to be understood in its ordinary
and plain meaning.
In death penalty cases controlled by the Omnibus Criminal Justice
Improvements Act of 1986, 1986 S.C. Acts 2955, which proceed to trial
after this opinion is published, if the defendant so requests, he may have
the following charge given in lieu of the "life imprisonment is to be
understood in its plain and ordinary meaning" charge:
A person who is convicted of murder must be punished by death
or by imprisonment for life. When the state seeks the death
penalty and a statutory aggravating circumstance is specifically
found beyond a reasonable doubt, and a recommendation of
death is not made, the trial court must impose a sentence of life
imprisonment without eligibility for parole until the service of
thirty years. When a statutory aggravating circumstance is not
found beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant shall be
sentenced to life imprisonment and he shall not be eligible for
parole until the service of twenty years. No person sentenced
under either of the sentencing schemes just explained may
receive any work-release credits, good-time credits, or any other
credit that would reduce the mandatory imprisonment.''
Unfortunately, the Atkins court failed to justify its apparently startling
rule, thus opening the way for the Torrence claim that the Atkins instructions
were incompatible with prior caselaw. In reality, the rule was startling only
because it showed that the Atkins court implicitly recognized that refusing
defense counsel's requests to inform capital sentencing juries about parole
could, in some cases, actually subvert the goal of preventing prejudice to the
defendant.
45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
98. Id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305.
99. Id.
100. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 58, 406 S.E.2d at 323 (Chandler, J., concurring).
101. Atkins, 293 S.C. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305-06.
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The Atkins decision presented a reasonable, fair, and enlightened
solution to cases in which defense counsel requests a jury charge concerning
parole. The ruling recognized and attempted to address a jury's possible
confusion about a defendant's possibility for parole. Additionally, Atkins
minimized potential prejudice to the defendant by allowing the defendant to
choose whether to have an instruction about parole.
The Atkins instruction originated in response to a defendant's request
for an instruction about parole; however, the court made no mention about
the application of the rule when a jury requests parole information.02 As
Torrence notes, the supreme court refrained from subsequently extending the
Atkins rule to cases in which the jury asked for information about parole
possibilities. 3
In both State v. Johnson"° and State v. Plemmons"°5 the supreme
court refused to extend Atkins to jury inquiry cases and held that the trial
judge must give both parts of the Norris instruction0 6 if the jury requests
information about the defendant's parole eligibility."° In Johnson and
Plemmons the juries asked if they could recommend a life sentence without
the possibility of parole. Both trial judges gave only the first part of the
Norris instruction, the "no concern of yours" part. In both cases the juries
returned a death sentence and the supreme court reversed, upholding the
requirement that the trial judge give both parts of the Norris instruction.l0"
In State v. Smith,"° however, the court held that the second part of
the Norris instruction, the "ordinary meaning" part, was sufficient. During
its deliberations, the Smith jury asked the court in a note: "'What does life
in prison mean (the term specifically regarding parole).' 1 10 Smith's trial
counsel submitted that Atkins required the trial judge to give the charge that
"'the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain
meaning.'"'i Thereafter, the trial judge gave the requested instruction
twice," but the jury sentenced Smith to death.
On appeal, Smith argued that "the trial judge's failure to instruct the
102. See id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305.
103. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 58-59, 406 S.E.2d at 323.
104. 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987).
105. 296 S.C. 76, 370 S.E.2d 871 (1988).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
107. Johnson, 293 S.C. at 327, 360 S.E.2d at 321; Plemmons, 296 S.C. at 79, 370
S.E.2d at 872.
108. Johnson, 293 S.C. at 327, 360 S.E.2d at 321; Plemmons, 296 S.C. at 79, 370
S.E.2d at 872.
109. 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990).
110. Id. at 487, 381 S.E.2d at 726-27 (quoting jury's note).
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jury 'not to consider parole'"-the first part of the Norris instruction-was
prejudicial error."' The supreme court disagreed, supporting its holding
with a contrived and unconvincing semantic analysis. First, the court
correctly noted that the jury's question was an attempt to determine whether
Smith, if sentenced to life imprisonment, could be paroled before he
died. 14 The Smith court then reasoned that "[i]n its 'ordinary and plain
meaning,' 'life imprisonment' can mean only what it says-in prison for
life. Being imprisoned for life and being paroled are mutually exclusive
propositions." "5 The trial judge's instruction answered the jury's question
because the only logical conclusion that a reasonable juror could draw from
the judge's instruction was that Smith would not be eligible for parole if
sentenced to life in prison."6 The court continued with the following
fiction: "To require reversal here based on the trial judge's failure to
mechanically recite the Norris charge is to ignore the fact that a 'life
imprisonment in its ordinary and plain meaning' charge necessarily
precludes jury consideration of parole eligibility.""1
7
The Smith majority then attempted to distinguish Johnson and
Plemmons by stating that those "juries, instructed only that parole was not
their concern, would have logically inferred that parole was someone else's
concern. Simply put, those juries were practically invited to speculate about
parole eligibility.""' The majority declared that the Smith jury was not
afforded such an opportunity for speculation because the trial judge's
"ordinary meaning" charge adequately instructed the jury not to consider
parole in sentencing deliberations." 9
In his Smith dissent, Justice Chandler, author of the Torrence concur-
rence that overruled Atkins, noted that the jury specifically requested
information about parole but was given a charge making "[n]o reference
whatsoever . . . to 'parole.'"" In a telling comment, he recognized "the
reality, known to 'the reasonable juror,' that, historically, life-term
defendants have been eligible for parole.""'
The Smith majority admitted that, standing alone, an instruction that a





117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 488, 381 S.E.2d at 727 (second emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 489, 381 S.E.2d at 728 (Chandler, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Id. at 489-90, 381 S.E.2d at 728.
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speculate about parole eligibility." Yet, it is difficult to understand how
an instruction concerning the "ordinary and plain meaning" of life imprison-
ment can alleviate jurors' concerns about parole, given that jurors under-
stand life imprisonment to include the possibility of parole.
Nevertheless, in two post-Torrence decisions, the supreme court has
persisted in embracing the fiction that the "ordinary and plain meaning"
charge allays jurors' questions about the relationship between a life sentence
and parole possibilities and precludes their consideration of parole eligibili-
ty. In State v. Davis"u the court emphasized that, in eliminating parole
information, "Torrence leaves intact the defendant's right upon request for
a plain meaning charge." 24
State v. Simmons"- presented the court with the question of whether
Torrence applies to a proposed charge on a defendant's ineligibility, as well
as eligibility, for parole. The defendant in Simmons requested a charge that
he would be ineligible for parole under South Carolina Code section 24-21-
640. 126 The trial judge refused the request and gave a general sentencing
charge, but the jury returned with the question: "'Does the imposition of a
life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?'"'27 In response to the
jury's question, the judge gave the State v. Norris28 charge that the jury
was not to consider parole and that "life imprisonment" should be under-
stood in its ordinary and plain meaning.'29
The Simmons court avoided the question of whether Torrence applies
to parole ineligibility by simply concluding that "a reasonable juror would
have understood from the charge given that life imprisonment indeed meant
life without parole."130 The court also apparently adopted the erroneous
view that, under California v. Ramos,"' the issue of informing juries
about parole eligibility or ineligibility "is solely a matter of state law. "132
122. Id. at 488, 381 S.E.2d at 727.
123. 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 220 (1991).
124. Id. at 251,411 S.E.2d at 222.
125. 427 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1993).
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see supra note 15 for
the relevant text of this section.
127. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting the jury's question).
128. 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
129. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 178.
130. Id. at 179 (Finney, J., dissenting).
131. 463 U.S. 992 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 133-141.
132. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 178 (emphasis added).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In California v. Ramos133 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of a jury instruction which explained that a governor
may modify a life-without-parole sentence. The jury in Ramos convicted the
defendant of murder. During the penalty phase, the trial judge gave the
statutorily mandated "Briggs Instruction," 34 informing the jury that "'a
Governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence of life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that would include the
possibility of parole.'"'35 On appeal, the defendant contended that inviting
capital sentencing juries to consider commutation was unconstitutional. The
California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the death
sentence. 136
The United States Supreme Court held that the instruction did not
violate either the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment.' 37 The Court
stated that the instruction "was merely an accurate statement of a potential
sentencing alternative,"138 and that the instruction "corrects a misconcep-
tion and supplies the jury with accurate information for its deliberation in
selecting an appropriate sentence."' 39 The Court also noted that "'it is
desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when
it makes the sentencing decision.'"'40 The Court made it clear that, in the
interest of providing greater protections in their criminal justice systems than
those required by the Constitution, states are free to impose restrictions
concerning information about capital sentencing.' 4 '
However, in both Torrence and Simmons the South Carolina Supreme
Court certainly did not provide greater protection for the defendant. Indeed,
by overruling State v. Atkins, 42 the Torrence court reopened the possibili-
ty that juries will impose death sentences in an arbitrary manner.
Consider the following hypothetical of two separate trials in which each
defendant is convicted of a capital crime. Assume that the two capital crimes
are identical and that each defendant is serving a sentence for a previous
133. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
134. Id. at 995 & n.4.
135. Id. at 996 (quoting jury instruction, Tr. at 1198-90).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1013.
138. Id. at 1009.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1009 n.23 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976)).
141. Id. at 1013-14.
142. 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), overruled by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C.
45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
[Vol. 44:383
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/5
INFORMING CAPITAL JURIES
violent crime conviction. Further assume that in each case the jury agrees
the defendant deserves life without the possibility of parole, which is, in
fact, a sentence mandated by the statute;143 however, each jury will render
a death sentence if it thinks that there is any chance the defendant will serve
less than an entire life sentence in prison. In each case, defense counsel
requests a charge on parole ineligibility, but the trial judge denies the charge
under State v. Torrence'44 and State v. Simmons.45 Jury 1, which hap-
pens to know the law regarding parole eligibility, realizes that the defendant
would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life. However, jury 2 labors
under the popular misconception that a "lifer" could be paroled in seven or
eight years.1 46 Jury 2 does not ask about parole, but even if it did, the
court would be permitted to give only the "ordinary meaning" charge
because of State v. Smith. 47 Of course, jury 2 sentences the defendant to
death, even though it believes a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate.
However, under the same facts, jury 1 imposes a life sentence, secure in the
knowledge that the defendant has no possibility of parole.
In limiting the information available to the sentencing jury, the
Torrence and Simmons courts ignored the United States Supreme Court's
sentiment expressed in Gregg v. Georgia:141
If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of
imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information... to be
able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then
accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a
reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury
of people who may never before have made a sentencing decision. 149
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A capital sentencing jury must decide whether to render either a sen-
tence of death or a sentence of life imprisonment. If the jury believes that
a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a minimum period of
time is appropriate, but renders a death sentence because it mistakenly
believes that imposition of a life sentence would result in parole eligibility
before service of that minimum period, the defendant has been severely
prejudiced. Of course, at the time of the sentencing it is impossible to
143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
144. 305 S.C. at 58, 406 S.E.2d at 323 (Chandler, J., concurring).
145. 427 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1993).
146. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
147. 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990).
148. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
149. Id. at 190.
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determine whether a jury is even considering a life sentence. Moreover, if
the jury believes a life sentence is appropriate, one cannot determine what
the jury considers to be a satisfactory minimum period of incarceration.
As discussed previously, a state-wide poll indicates that most potential
jurors in South Carolina believe that capital defendants sentenced to life
imprisonment will eventually be eligible for parole.' The same study also
indicates that potential jurors are often misinformed about the minimum time
defendants with life sentences must serve before becoming eligible for pa-
role. '' However, statutes mandate the actual time any given capital
defendant sentenced to life must serve before becoming eligible for
parole. 152
Using the evidence of juror misperception and the actual statutory
provisions, the author has formulated the following jury instruction as a
solution to the complex problem of informing capital juries about parole:
In all death penalty cases in which the sentencing jury inquires about
the parole possibilities of a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment or
the meaning of the phrase "life imprisonment," or in which the
defendant requests a jury charge concerning the parole possibilities of
a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment or a jury charge concerning
the meaning of the phrase "life imprisonment," the trial judge shall give
one of the following two charges, whichever one the defendant elects.
(1) The term "life imprisonment" is to be understood in its ordinary
and plain meaning.
(2) If a defendant is convicted of murder and a recommendation of
death is not made, and the defendant is serving a sentence for a prior
violent crime conviction unrelated to the crime for which he is being
sentenced, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. A defendant who has not previously been
convicted of a violent crime but whose present conviction is for a crime
specifically found beyond a reasonable doubt to include a statutory
aggravating circumstance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without
eligibility for parole until the service of thirty years. A defendant who
has not previously been convicted of a violent crime and whose present
conviction is for a crime not found beyond a reasonable doubt to include
a statutory aggravating circumstance shall be sentenced to life imprison-
ment without eligibility for parole until the service of twenty years. No
person under any of the sentencing schemes just explained may receive
any work-release credits, good-time credits, or any other credit that
would reduce the mandatory imprisonment. Decisions regarding parole,
however, are made by the parole board, and you are not to consider the
150. See supra text accompanying note 7; Appendix, Table 1.
151. See supra text accompanying note 6; Appendix, Table 2.
152. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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possibility of parole in rendering your sentence. To do so would be a
violation of your oaths as jurors.
This instruction is consistent with the goals of providing juries with
information about parole and preventing prejudice to the defendant. In
particular, the proposed instruction alleviates prejudice to the defendant in
the most conspicuous case in which it is likely to arise-when the defendant
is ineligible for parole. In other cases, the defendant would decide which
instruction is the most advantageous.
Admonishing the jury not to consider parole in their deliberations is not
hypocritical when accurate information about parole precedes the admoni-
tion. However, such an admonition is misleading, or at least confusing,
when it is appended to an "ordinary and plain meaning" instruction. By
adopting the proposed instruction, South Carolina would join the ranks of
those states that allow capital juries to be informed of a defendant's parole
possibilities when a life sentence carries no possibility of parole.'53
153. Twenty-two states other than South Carolina both allow juries to participate in
capital sentencing and authorize, in at least some cases, life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole as an alternative to the death penalty.
The following thirteen states expressly inform the jury of the defendant's
ineligibility for parole by the terms of the sentencing verdict or the recommendation
itself:
Alabama: see ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1982) (compelling capital sentencing jury
to return advisory verdict either of life imprisonment without parole or of
death).
Arkansas: see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(b), (c) (Michie Supp. 1991) (stating
that jury must impose sentence of death or of "life imprisonment without
parole").
California: see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (providing that penalty
shall be death or confinement for "a term of life without the possibility of
parole").
Connecticut: see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f) (West 1985) (providing
for sentence of death or of "life imprisonment without the possibility of
release").
Delaware: see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(a) (1987) (stating that sentencing
alternatives are death or "imprisonment for the remainder of his or her natural
life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction").
Louisiana: see LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.6 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that jury must render sentence of death or of "life imprisonment
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence").
Maryland: see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (1992) (stating that jury must
choose between sentence of "death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole").
Missouri: see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (stating that
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punishment shall be death or "imprisonment for life without eligibility for
probation or parole, or release except by act of the governor").
Nevada: see NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.552 (Michie 1992) (providing that
defendant shall be sentenced to death or to "life imprisonment with or without
possibility of parole").
New Hampshire: see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(V) (Supp. 1992) (specifying
that court must impose sentence of death or of "life imprisonment without
possibility of parole").
Oklahoma: see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10(A) (West Supp. 1993) (stating
that sentencing alternatives are death, "life imprisonment without parole or life
imprisonment").
Oregon: see OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105(1)(a) (1990) (specifying that available
sentences are death, "life imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole or life imprisonment").
Washington: see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(1) (West 1990) (providing
choice between death and "life imprisonment without possibility of release or
parole").
Three other states, by statute or decision, require the capital sentencing jury to be
informed that the defendant will be ineligible for parole, either in all cases or when the
defendant's prior criminal record precludes parole eligibility:
Colorado: see COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(l)(b) (Supp. 1992) (providing that
capital sentencing jury shall be instructed that life imprisonment means life
without the possibility of parole for twenty years, for forty years, or without
any possibility of parole, depending upon the time and nature of the murder).
Illinois: see People v. Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (11.) (holding that when a term of
natural life imprisonment is the statutorily required alternative to a death
sentence, jury must be instructed to that effect and that such a sentence carries
no possibility of parole), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988).
Mississippi: see Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 675 (Miss. 1990) (Lee, C.J.,
dissenting) ("At the sentencing phase, the jury shall be entitled to know by
instruction whether the defendant is eligible for parole."), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 910 (1991).
Four states appear not to have considered the issue of informing capital sentencing
juries about a defendant's parole ineligibility:
Florida: see FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.142(4)(b) (Harrison Supp. 1992) (providing
that capital drug trafficking felonies carry sentence of death or life without
parole); no case law on whether jury may be informed of defendant's parole
ineligibility.
South Dakota: see S.D. CODImED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1988) ("A person
sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole . . . ."); no case law
on whether jury may be informed of defendant's parole ineligibility.
Utah: see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-408 (1990) (providing sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for person convicted of third sex offense); id. §
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77-27-9 (Supp. 1992) (stating that parole board can parole person sentenced to
life without parole if board finds person is "permanently incapable of being a
threat to safety of society"); no case law on whether jury may be informed of
defendant's parole ineligibility.
Wyoming: see WYO. STAT. § 7-13-402(a) (Supp. 1992) (providing that person
serving life sentence may not be paroled); no case law on whether jury may be
informed of defendant's parole ineligibility.
Two states with life-without-parole sentences refuse jurors information about a
defendant's ineligibility for parole:
Pennsylvania: see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(b) (1983) (providing that
arson murder carries sentence of death or "life imprisonment without right to
parole"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1992)
(providing that sentence for first degree murder is death or life imprisonment);
61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 331.21 (Supp. 1992) (stating that parole board is
not authorized to release on parole convicts serving life imprisonment);
Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 941 (Pa. 1990) (holding that trial
court properly denied instruction that sentence of life imprisonment means life
without parole), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1338 (1991).
Virginia: see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Michie Supp. 1992) (authorizing death
or imprisonment for life as punishment for Class 1 felony); id. § 53.1-151(B),
(B1), (B2) (1991) (providing circumstances under which person will not be
eligible for parole); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360, 369-70 (Va.
1992) (declining invitation by defendant to change court's long-standing
position that "a jury may not be informed by evidence or instructions of a
defendant's parole eligibility in the event of a life sentence"), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1862 (1993).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE IF SENTENCED TO
LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Question: "When a person is convicted for murder in South Carolina,
they must be sentenced to life imprisonment or to the death
penalty. If a person is sentenced to life imprisonment does
this mean that they will have to spend the rest of their life
in prison or can they be released from prison at some point
in the future?"
Response N %
Will Have To Serve Rest Of Their Life 82 20.0
Can Be Released At Some Point 293 71.6
Don't Know 34 8.3
TABLE 2
AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT IN PRISON IF SENTENCED
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Question: "If you heard today that someone was sentenced by a court
in South Carolina to life imprisonment for committing a
murder, about how much time do you think they would




































Rest of Their Life 29 7.1
Don't Know 137 33.5
(IF DON'T KNOW, PROBE: "Do you think it would be less than
ten years, between ten and nineteen years, twenty to twenty-nine
years, or thirty years, or more?")
Categories (All Responses) N %
Less Than Ten Years 64 15.6
Ten To Nineteen Years 131 32.0
Twenty To Twenty-Nine Years 101 24.7
Thirty Years Or More 61 14.9
Don't Know 23 5.6
Rest Of Their Life 29 7.1
TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING TIME BEFORE CHANCE
OF RELEASE
Question: "As you may know, in South Carolina the jury normally
decides whether to sentence a convicted murderer to life
imprisonment or to the death penalty. If you were on a jury
and had to make that decision, how important would it be
for you to know how much time the person would have to
spend in prison before they would have a chance to be
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released, if you sentenced them to life imprisonment...
extremely important, very important, somewhat important,
not too important, or not at all important?"
Response N%
Extremely Important 176 43.0
Very Important 137 33.5
Somewhat Important 42 10.3
Not Too Important 10 2.4
Not At All Important 18 4.4
Don't Know 26 6.4
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